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AVIATION TORT LIABILITY: THE NEED FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL AVIATION
LIABILITY ACT
In 1903, the Wright brothers made their historic flight at
Kitty Hawk.1 Since that time, aviation has expanded tremendously. Today, a single commercial aircraft can seat over three
hundred passengers 2 and the number of commercial planes is
expected to double by 1994. 3 The recent deregulation of airline
competition 4 may stimulate further growth as the number of aircraft flying over the same routes increases or new routes are
added.
Although commercial airlines have an excellent safety record,5 collisions, negligent operation, and faulty equipment will
occasionally cause aviation disasters. 6 The ensuing injuries and
deaths will give rise to complicated litigation 7 and strain the judicial system with numerous claims. 8 These claims may be filed
1. 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BR1TANICA 1032 (1979).
2. Comment, The Casefor a Federal Common Law of Aircraft Litigation: A Judicial Solution to a National Problem, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 232
n.12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as JudicialSolution]. For instance, the most
popular wide-body jet in the United States, the DC-10, is designed to accommodate up to 343 passengers. NEWSWEEK, June 11, 1979, at 38. See note 53
infra for a discussion of the potential impact of these wide-body aircraft on
the judicial system.
3. AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, September 1, 1980, at 66. In
1979, domestic airlines in the United States carried 300 million passengers, a
seventy-five percent increase in just ten years. See U.S. NEWS &WORLD REPORT, March 10, 1980, at 58.

4. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1708
(codified in scattered sections of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1542 (1979)), allows airlines to reduce fares and increase the number
of flights flown without approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board (the economic regulatory agency of the federal government). In one year, airlines
added flights to more than 100 cities. TIME, November 12, 1979, at 113. The
Act's purpose is to make airlines more competitive, but takes a gradual approach to deregulation over a five year period.
5. Traveling by commercial airlines is one of the safest ways to travel.
It is estimated to be more then 33 times safer then driving. U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, October 9, 1978, at 45. In a ten year period between 1969 and
1979, commercial aviation fatalities ranged from a high of 467 in 1974 to a low
of 153 in 1976. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 10, 1980, at 57.
6. See generally JudicialSolution, supra note 2.
7. Note, The Applicability of Federal Common Law to Aviation Tort
Litigation, 63 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1084 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FederalCommon Law].

8. For example, 118 wrongful death actions arose from one aviation disaster involving a DC-10 crash near Chicago. In re Air Crash Disaster near

Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
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in different jurisdictions with resulting duplication of effort for
the parties and the courts. The state judicial systems presently
cannot relieve the burden of aviation disaster litigation; while
the federal judicial system can reduce this burden through
venue provisions 9 and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,10 these devices do not cover all aspects of litigation." Another major problem is that conflicting judgments may arise out
of the same aviation disaster because each jurisdiction has its
own choice of law and recovery rules. 12 Thus, the unpredictability that results from aviation disaster litigation complicates client counseling. 13 There is at present no uniform state law to
4
solve the conflicts. Although several federal causes of action'
provide uniformity in the law by superseding state law, there is
no guarantee that all claims arising out of an aviation disaster
will be decided by federal law. Potentially, federal common law
could provide uniformity in litigation, but would have to be formulated on a case-by-case basis.' 5 Thus, the present judicial
mechanisms are not equipped to handle aviation disasters.
This comment will explore the inadequacy of modem choice
of law analysis and the strain on an overburdened judicial system in present day aviation disaster litigation. The viability of
current proposed solutions will also be discussed. Finally, this
comment will recommend a new federal law encompassing both
procedural and substantive aspects of litigating aviation
disasters.
EXISTING PROBLEMS IN AVIATION DISASTER CASES

Choice of Law Problems
The first problem in litigating aviation disaster cases concerns choice of law rules, that is, determination of which law will
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation can consolidate for pretrial purposes but not for the actual trial.
12. For instance, Illinois allows certain persons other than a decedent's
spouse or next of kin to institute a wrongful death action. Those persons,
however, can recover only if they furnished medical care or hospitalization
to the deceased or acted as administrator for the deceased's estate. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). Missouri allows a plaintiff
ad litem to bring action if there is no spouse or next of kin; there is no
recovery limitation (e.g., limiting recovery to actual medical costs). Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
13. Conklin, Aviation-Doubt in the Courthouse: Is the Federal Law
Supreme or Not?, 20 TRIAL L. GUME 476, 480 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Conklin].
14. See notes 101-135 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 136-183 and accompanying text infra.
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apply. 16 In Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, i7 the United States
Supreme Court held that the federal courts had to apply the
substantive law of the state in which the court sat.'8 Three
years later, in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electronic Manufacturing
Co.,'9 the Court extended Erie by holding that federal district
20
courts had to apply the state's choice of law rule as well.

For years, the Klaxon holding presented no problem in aviation disaster cases. Certainty in the litigation of aviation disaster cases was assured since all states applied the rule of lex loci
delicti2 ' i.e. the law of the place of the wrong was applied for all
aspects of tort law. 22 All plaintiffs, no matter where they

brought suit, would litigate under the same law. In the 1960s,
however, the lex loci delicti rule came under attack as being too
rigid 23 because in many tort cases, especially aviation disasters,
the place of the wrong was often fortuitous.
The abandonment of lex loci delicti began with Kilberg v.
Northwest Airlines.24 In Kilberg, the plaintiff's decedent, a resident of New York, was killed in an airplane crash in Massachusetts. The action, however, was instituted in New York.
Massachusetts imposed a damage limitation in a wrongful death
action, 25 while New York allowed unlimited recovery. 26 The issue on appeal was whether Massachusetts' statutory limitation
should apply. The court found that since the site of an airplane
crash is largely a matter of chance, the court had an obligation to
16. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (3d ed. 1969).
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1936).
18. Id. at 78. The Erie court reasoned that state substantive law should
apply because there is no general common law among the states. The law
of each state exists by the authority of that state without regard to the law
of other states. Id. at 79. If choice of law were determined by citizenship,
plaintiffs could avoid applying unfavorable state law by moving to another
state and taking advantage of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 76.
19. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
20. Id. at 496. The Court stated that a different holding would result in
inconsistency, disrupting the equal administration of justice by coordinate
state and federal courts. A state is free to determine whether a given matter is to be governed by its own law or some other law. Applying a federal
choice of law rule would disrupt this freedom.
21. 1 KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCMENT LAW, § 2.02 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as KREINDLER].
22. Id. The place of the wrong is defined as where the last event necessary to make the actor liable took place. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 377 (1934). Thus, the law of the state where the injury occurred
would be applied over the law of the place of death. D'Aleman v. Pan Am
World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).

23. Comment, Air Crash Litigation: Disasterin the Courts, 7 Sw. U. L.

REV. 661, 669 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Disaster].
24. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
25. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (1960).
26. N.Y. EST. POWERS &TRUSTS (Consol.) ch. 13, § 130 (1950).
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protect citizens of its jurisdiction against unfair treatment in a
law suit arising from an aviation disaster.2 7 Therefore, the court
refused to enforce the provision limiting damages, but in all
was governed by the Masother aspects of the litigation, the suit
28
sachusetts wrongful death statute.
Although the Kilberg court did not abandon the lex loci
delicti rule for all purposes, the decision enabled other courts to
do so. 2 9 In Babcock v. Jackson,30 the plaintiff and the defendant,
31
both New York residents, were traveling in Ontario, Canada.32
Ontario had a guest statute which barred recovery of damages.
The court noted that jurisdictions other than the one where the
accident occurred had an interest in the litigation. 33 Since Ontario had no real interest in the litigation between two New York
residents, the court applied New York law. 34 The court aban-

of a more flexible
doned the doctrine of lex loci delicti in favor
35
approach called the center of gravity test.

The center of gravity test, also called the significant contacts
test, gives controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which
has the greatest concern or contacts with the specific issue involved. 36 Under the lex l6ci delicti doctrine, the court looked
only to where the tort occurred. By contrast, in the significant
contacts test, the occurrence of the tort in a particular state is
only one of many factors to be considered in determining choice
of law. Other important factors often considered are the parties'
residence,3 7 where the breach of duty occurred, 38 and where the
relationship between the parties is centered. 39 Although the significant contacts test was intended to be more flexible than the
lex loci delicti rule, the courts began mechanically counting
27. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527-28,

211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (1961).
28. Id. at 42, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
29. KREINDLER, supra note 21, at § 2.02. The author calls the Kilberg decision the most important conflicts case ever decided in the United States
because the decision was the beginning of the end of lex loci delicti.
30. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
31. Id. at 476, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
32. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960).

33. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (1963).
34. Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
35. Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
36. Id.

37. RESTATEMENT
38. Id.
39. Id.

(SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 145 (1971).
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contacts and the test became as rigid as the doctrine of lex loci
delicti.4

Dissatisfied with the significant contacts test, courts turned
to the significant relationship test. 41 Like significant contacts,
this test looked to the various contacts a state had to the litigation. However, the significant relationship test added two elements: consideration of the purposes of the laws in issue and of
each state's interest in fulfilling those purposes. 42 Thus, other
contacts being equal, the law of the state whose interests were
affected most by the litigation was applied.
More recently, courts have used the interest analysis approach to solve conflict of laws problems. Interest analysis
places more emphasis than the significant relationship test on
which state has the greatest interest in the litigation. 43 Under
interest analysis, the court applies the forum's law if the forum
state has an interest in the issue involved, unless another state's
interest predominates.4 In deciding if a state has an interest in
the litigation, the court looks to whether that state has a genuine
concern with the outcome of a particular issue. 45 The state may
be genuinely concerned if that state's policy will be significantly
impaired if its law is not applied, or if that state has a particu46
larly strong commitment to the law involved.
40. Douglas, Air Disaster Litigation Without Diversity, 45 J. AIR L. &

COM. 411, 427 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Douglas].
41. This test, used by the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
,145 (1971), is very similar to the significant contacts test; both use set principles to achieve certainty. The Restatement considers the following contacts: the place where the injury occurred; the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; the domicile, residence, or nationality of the
parties; and the location of the defendant's business. These contacts are
weighed according to their relative importance with respect to the particular injury. The Restatement approach also considers the policies of the forum and other interested states. Nevertheless, the significant relationship
test looks to the same contacts as the significant contacts test.
42. KREINDLER, supra note 21, at § 2.05.
43. Id. at § 2.07. Assume two residents of state A are involved in an accident in state B and one resident sues the other resident in state A. If state
B has a high standard of liability and state A has a low standard of liability,
the significant relationship test and interest analysis could give rise to different results.
Under the significant relationship test, state B's law might not be applied if the court determines that not only does state A have an interest in
the litigation, but state A has more contacts than state B. Under interest
analysis, state B's law would be applied because refusal to apply its law
would impair the policy of B and result in unfairness to the plaintiff who
might receive less than a plaintiff from another jurisdiction.
44. Id. at § 2.06.
45. Id.

46. Id. In the interest analysis approach, the court must determine if
the interests of two or more states are involved. If so, then there is a genuine conflict which must be resolved by looking to which state has the
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While the newer tests, from significant contacts through in-

terest analysis, provide more flexibility in determining which
state law will apply, it is done at the expense of great uncertainty.4 7 There is no definite way to ascertain beforehand what
law the court will apply. In addition, the cost of aviation liability
insurance is increased because insurance carriers have to as-

sume that the most unfavorable standards will apply.48
The present conflict of laws tests encourage plaintiffs to forum shop.4 9 Additionally, two plaintiffs, each suing in a different
district or court, may receive different judgments based on the
same set of facts. 50 The choice of law process also adds to the
51
In
time and cost of litigation and tends to inhibit settlements.
a car crash, the flexibility provided by the modern conflicts of
law approach may outweigh its difficulties. By contrast, in an
aviation disaster where there are multiple plaintiffs and claims,
the difficulties are compounded and the court may find resolu52
tion difficult if not impossible.
stronger governmental interest in seeing its law applied to the issue in conflict.
In recent times, the issue has been more narrowly defined. This process is known as depeqge. The idea is to search for the rule of law that can
be most appropriately applied to govern that particular issue. The conflict,
then, is between two rules of law rather than two state laws. Id.
While a state might have an interest in one issue of the case, it might
not have an interest in another issue. Thus, interest analysis requires separate analysis of each issue. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 61 Cal. App. 3d 501, 132 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976).
47. Note, Aircraft Crash Litigation, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1052, 1054
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Aircraft Crash Litigation].
48. Tydings, Air Crash Litigation: A Judicial Problem and a Congressional Solution, 18 AMER. U. L. REV. 299, 304 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Tydings].
49. See generally Aircraft Crash Litigation, supra note 47.
50. A typical aircrash involves numerous passengers who are residents
of a number of different states. If these passengers sue in the district in
which they live, conflicting judgments may result because each court could
apply a different state's law. Tydings, supra note 48, at 306.
51. Id. at 304. Since parties are unsure of exactly how much they may
recover or how much they may be liable for, they may not be willing to
settle.
52. Disaster,supra note 23, at 671. A recent case, In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981), illustrates the problem with the modern conflicts approach. A DC-10 on a flight
from Chicago to Los Angeles crashed near Chicago. All persons on board as
well as two persons on the ground were killed. From this disaster, 118
wrongful death actions were filed in four states and Puerto Rico.
Many plaintiffs requested punitive damages and the issue was appealed. The Seventh Circuit based its decision on the modern conflict of
laws approach. Seven states had an interest in the litigation and, from
these seven states, the court had to determine which state had the most
significant relationship to the accident and apply that state's law on punitive damages. Ultimately, the court applied the conflicts rule of each state
where actions had been fied. After finding several of the states' interests
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Overburdeningthe JudicialSystem
Besides presenting choice of law problems, aviation disaster
cases frequently give rise to a multitude of suits based on identical claims arising out of the same event. For example, one collision could result in as many as seven hundred claims.53 Each
passenger would be suing for injuries caused by the same occurrence, yet each passenger might litigate the same facts in a different court. This causes wasteful litigation, inefficiency, and
injustice due to the duplication of discovery, attorney's fees, and
other litigation costs and procedures. In addition, since laws
vary widely from state to state,5 two plaintiffs whose cases arise
out of the same aviation disaster may end up with inconsistent
and conflicting results. 55 Finally, there may be situations where
56
a plaintiff must bring his claims in two different courts.
The above mentioned problems could have a negative effect
on the judicial system. 57 The system currently is not equipped
to handle aviation disasters because state courts and federal
courts in diversity actions have to deal with choice of law
balanced, the court applied the law of the forum (Illinois). Through a long
and difficult process, the court used modern conflict of laws analysis and
arrived at the result which lex loci delicti would have achieved.
53. Judicial Solution, supra note 2, at 232. Wide-body planes can now
carry over 350 passengers. Two planes colliding in midair could give rise to
700 claims. To date, the worst aviation disaster occurred when two jumbo
jets collided on a runway in the Canary Islands on March 27, 1977. 581 persons died. TIME, June 4, 1979, at 12. The worst United States disaster has
been the DC-10 crash near Chicago referred to in note 52 supra. In that
crash, 271 persons died. TiME, June 4, 1979, at 12.
54. Differences in state laws may be extremely important in aviation
disaster cases on such issues as negligence, amount of recovery, res ipsa
loquitur, breach of warranty, due care, and defenses. See generally Kinzy,
Current Aviation Decisions in Conflict of Laws, 41 J. Am. L. & COM. 311
(1975) (discussion of how choice of law is handled for specific issues).
55. Disaster,supra note 23, at 672-74. This has been a recurring problem
since the early fifties. For example, four cases arose out of a single aircrash
at Mt. Carmel, Pennsylvania. One suit filed in Pennsylvania, Schuyler v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 472 (M.D. Pa. 1950) resulted in a judgment
for the defendant. Two months later, however, the plaintiff in a New York
case, De Vito v. United Air Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. N.Y. 1951) received $160,000 (reduced from a $300,000 verdict). Two other suits from the
same crash also litigated in New York, Kendall v. United Air Lines, Inc., and
Sebo v. United Air Lines, Inc., 200 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1952) (consolidated on
appeal), resulted in verdicts of $150,000 and $100,000 respectively.
56. Kennelly, Aviation Law: Domestic Air Travel-A Brief Diagnosis
and Prognosis, 56 Cm. B. REc. 248, 255 (1975). The author suggests two
ways this could happen. First, if diversity is lacking between a plaintiff and
one of the defendants, the plaintiff may have to present his claims against
that defendant in the state court and against another defendant in the federal court. Second, litigation could end up in the courts of different states.
57. See generally JudicialSolution, supra note 2. In 1979, domestic airlines carried 300 million passengers. U.S. NEWS &WoRLD REPORT, March 10,
1980, at 57.
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problems; even application of some federal statutes will involve
choice of laws problems.5 8 Therefore, a federal action may not
provide any more uniformity than state law. State courts cannot
reduce the effects of multiple plaintiffs, and although federal
courts, by transferring all cases to one forum, can reduce the
workload of aviation disaster cases, they can do so only to a limited extent.5 9 However, since some federal actions are of limited
use, 60 many parties may not be able to avail themselves of the
federal courts. Unless a solution is found, the present problems
will only be compounded because, as the aviation industry
grows, the number of disasters will increase, resulting in more
6
litigation. '
EXISTING SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF AVIATION
DISASTER CASES

Uniform State Laws
One possible solution to the problems of aviation disaster
litigation is a uniform state law. 62 The first question concerning
such a law is whether it would be constitutional. Since torts are
58. See, e.g., the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). In
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1961), the Supreme Court held that
section 1346 of the Federal Tort Claims Act requires application of the
whole state law where the tort occurred. This included that state's choice of
law rule. Thus, a district court, in an action involving the act, would have to
go through the same process as a state court would in determining which
law would apply.
59. See notes 88-95 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The Panel can only transfer and
consolidate for pretrial purposes; the actual trial for each claim must be litigated separately. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).
60. See notes 101-124 and accompanying text infra on admiralty jurisdiction. Unless the accident occurs over water, admiralty jurisdiction cannot
even be considered in an aviation disaster case.
61. See Tydings, supra note 48, at 315: "As engineers are improving airport facilities and revising aircraft safety procedures in the anticipation of
the greater demands soon to be placed by increased air travel and larger
aircraft, laws and legislators have an obligation to keep pace."
62. Examples of uniform state laws include the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Uniform Probate Act. These laws are usually drafted by the
National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. There are three officially
appointed commissioners from each jurisdiction (all fifty states, the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and most United States territories) plus a few life
members. Leflar, Maurice H. Merrill and Uniform State Laws, 25 OKLA. L.
REV. 501 (1972). When the commissioners decide to create a new act, a committee is appointed to draft statutes for the next annual meeting. Successive drafts are presented at each meeting until the act is officially offered to
the states for enactment. Id. The commissioners meet annually at the
same place as the American Bar Association and record their activities in
their own handbook. Note, Uniformity in the Law-The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 19 MoNT. L. REV. 149, 153
(1958). Each jurisdiction is entitled to one vote to approve a proposed act.
Id.
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considered primarily a matter of state concern, 63 a uniform state
law would protect state interests in tort litigation because its enactment would be based on the state's police power. At the
same time, a uniform state law would not place an undue burden on interstate commerce. Airlines are already subject to
state laws concerning liability; 64 thus a uniform state law would

not usurp or interfere with the federal government's control
65
over aviation.
A uniform state law would help solve aviation disaster litigation problems because the law would be the same no matter
where the claim was brought. Parties could litigate their claims
without the uncertainty that now exists in aviation disaster
cases. In fact, the idea has been tried before. The National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
Aviation Liability Act in 1938.66 The Act was based on strict liability for both personal injury and67 property damage occurring
within a state that passed the Act.

There are, however, two insurmountable problems with a
uniform state law. First, there is no way to consolidate multiple
claims filed in different states. Each state would have its own
discovery and trial, so there would still be duplication of litigation even if the standards of liability were the same. More importantly, for such an act to work, it must be approved by all or
at least a significant number of states. 68 Otherwise, the choice
of law problems would remain. 69 Since there is no guarantee of
63. Disaster, supra note 23, at 663. Tort duties traditionally have been
tied to community public policies.
64. Since colonial times, tort claims involving public carriers have been

uniformly entrusted to the state courts. Morris, Constitutional and Procedural Problems Presented by Proposalsin Congress on Tort Liability in Air
Transportation, 14 INS. COUNSEL J. 22, 23 (1947).
65. Comment, Conflict of Laws-Desirabilityof Federal Legislation in
Commercial Aviation, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1632 (1965).

66. The commissioners' draft was not the first attempt to propose a uniform law. In 1911 the committee refused to recommend a proposal before
the American Bar Association Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform. In 1922, the commissioners adopted the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics which was later abandoned in favor of a series of uniform acts
dealing with aviation. The most controversial of the acts presented was the
Uniform Aviation Liability Act. Comment, Uniform State Aviation Liability
Legislation, 1948 Wis. L. REv. 356.
67. Tydings, supra note 48, at 308. Another controversial aspect of the

act was the provision calling for compulsory insurance. Comment, Uniform
State Aviation Liability Legislation, 1948 Wis. L. REv. 356, 370. The Act was

withdrawn in 1953. In 1956 the National Commission recommended that a
new code be drafted, but so far nothing has happened. Tydings, supra note
48, at 308.
68. Comment, Conflict of Laws-Desirabilityof Federal Legislation in
Commercial Aviation, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1632 (1965).
69. Id.
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passage in every jurisdiction, a uniform state law is an inadequate solution to the problems of litigating aviation disasters.
Federal Legislation

Federal legislation, instead of a uniform state law, could
solve many aviation disaster litigation problems. Actually, federal legislation is more desirable than state legislation because
most aviation disaster cases end up in the federal courts under
diversity of citizenship. 70 In addition, the federal system is conducive to reducing the burden of multiple claims through such
mechanisms as the venue provisions. 71 This reduces the burden
on the courts in that all actions are in one court with a single
discovery process rather than a separate one for each claim.
Also, removing all cases to the same district is some guarantee
of consistency in results among plaintiffs. Finally, the Federal
Aviation Act of 195872 and regulations promulgated thereunder

indicate that aviation should rest entirely within federal juris73
diction because of the inclusive nature of the Act.

In some areas, the federal judicial system can reduce aviation disaster litigation problems. While these areas include admiralty law and the federal common law, the most significant
inroads have been made in reducing the burden on the judicial
system caused by multidistrict litigation.
70. Diversity of citizenship is one of the bases of original jurisdiction in
federal court and occurs when there is an actual and substantial controversy between citizens of different states. BALLENTrnE's LAw DICTIONARY
363 (3d ed. 1969).
71. See notes 74-86 and accompanying text infra.
72. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
73. Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974). 'The
basis for imposing a federal law ...is ...the predominant, indeed almost
exclusive, interest of the federal government in regulating the affairs of the
nation's airways." Id. at 403. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 declares that
the United States exercises complete and exclusive national sovereignty of
its airspace. 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1976). Furthermore, the Act shows that
Congress intended that the federal government take responsibility for regulating air traffic. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Northwest
Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring):
Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move
only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands
of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal
commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in
an elaborate and detailed system of controls. * * * Its privileges, rights
and protection, so far as transit is concerned, it owes to the Federal
Government alone and not to any state government.
It seems then, that if all aspects of aviation except litigation are controlled by the federal government, and the federal government's interest in
promoting safety is so strong, control of the litigation of aviation disasters
by the federal government would promote the interest in safety and be consistent with the present legislative acts. See JudicialSolution, supra note

2, at 249.
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Federal Statutes Governing MultidistrictLitigation
One method of easing the burden of multidistrict litigation
is a change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. 74 Section 1404 allows transfer from one district court to another for all purposes
in a civil action for the convenience of the parties and witnesses
and in the interest of justice. 75 This section was essentially a
codification of forum non conveniens,76 but without that doctrine's harsh result of dismissal. 77 For this reason, a lesser standard of inconvenience is needed to invoke section 1404 than
traditionally was needed forforum non conveniens.78 Once the
transfer is made, however, the transferee court is bound to ap79
ply the law of the state where the transferor court sits.
Additionally, there is a requirement that the action be transferred to a district where it might have been brought.8 0 This has
been held to mean that the transferee court must be in a district
where the plaintiff had an absolute right to litigate at the time
the action was filed.8 ' Federal, not state rules control, however,
in deciding where an action might have been brought.8 2 To hold
otherwise would restrict the applicability of the section and
therefore frustrate its purpose. Thus, section 1404 allows litigation of all aviation disaster claims in one place, avoiding waste83
ful duplication of discovery and litigation.
Despite the advantages section 1404 presents in aviation disasters, there are two major problems with its use. First, under
the present requirements of section 1404, the action must be
transferred to a district where the accident occurred or where all
the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside.8 4 In an aviation disas74. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).

75. Id.
76. The forum non conveniens doctrine states that, where justice suggests that the controversy may be more suitably tried elsewhere, jurisdiction should be declined and the parties relegated to seek relief in the other
forum. BALLENTINE's LAw DICTIONARY 493 (3d ed. 1969).
77. 1 SPEISER, AVIATION TORT LAw 235 (1979).
78. Id.
79. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).
81. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
82. Farrell v. Wyatt, 408 F.2d 662, 665 (2d Cir. 1969) ("Where a case
'might have been brought' refers to federal laws of venue, service and jurisdiction. . . ."). See also Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)
(Supreme Court's discussion of same principle).
83. All districts where claims are filed could transfer the claims to a single district.
84. Comment, FederalCourts-ProposedAircraft Crash Litigation Legislation,35 Sw. L. REv. 215, 217 (1970). The venue provisions apply in diversity cases; the plaintiff may bring his action only where all the plaintiffs
reside, where all the defendants reside, or where the claim arose. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a) (1976).
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ter, it is unlikely that all the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside in the same district; the only other choice, then, will be
where the accident occurred, 85 which may not always be the
most convenient forum for any of the parties. Additionally,
where there is a choice of venue, the transferor courts may disa86
gree on which is the most convenient court.
The other major problem concerns choice of law. Under section 1404, the transferee court must apply the law of the state
where the transferor court sits. 87 If several state laws are involved, the jury could become confused in trying to reach a verdict. Furthermore, one could reach an inconsistent result in the
same courtroom among virtually identical plaintiffs. When
there are multiple claims arising out of one aviation disaster,
fairness dictates that similar claims arising out of one act be decided the same way. This is particularly true if there is no basic
difference between plaintiffs who are allowed to recover and
plaintiffs who are barred from recovery.
Another device used to reduce the burden on the federal ju88
dicial system is the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
The Panel has the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) to transfer all
cases involving one or more common questions of fact to any
district for pretrial proceedings. The Panel must look to
whether the transfer will promote the convenience of the parties
and witnesses and whether the transfer will promote the just
and efficient conduct of the actions. 89 Proceedings for transfer
may be made on the motion of any party to the suit or on the
Panel's own motion. The Panel may also sever and remand any
claim, cross-claim or third party claim to the district from which
it came. 90 At the conclusion of the pretrial proceedings, each action is remanded to its original district unless the action has
been terminated. 91 Thus far, the Panel has limited itself to ordering transfers or remands. 92 One advantage to using the
85. Comment, Federal Courts-ProposedAircraft Litigation Legislation, 35 Sw. L. Rav. 215, 217 (1970).
86. Id.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

This includes a state's choice of law rule.
Hereinafter cited as the Panel.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).
Martin, MultidistrictLitigation-A Panaceaor a Blight, 18 TRIAL L.
GUIDE 409, 414 (1975). In one case, In re Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, December 29, 1972, 360 F. Supp. 1394 (J.P.M.D.L 1973), the plaintiffs
sought to compel the defendants to pay for reasonable travel expenses in
connection with attending the pretrial proceedings. The Panel refused to
rule on the request because the granting of such a request was outside the
scope of power conferred under § 1407. See also In re Air Crash Disaster at
Greater Cincinnati Airport, 354 F. Supp. 275 (J.P.M.D.L 1973) (Panel re-
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Panel is that it prevents waste of judicial resources by consolidating all discovery proceedings into one court. Another advantage is that there are no venue provisions, so the transferee
court need not necessarily be the court of the district where the
accident occurred. 93 Finally, one judicial entity decides to which
district the cases will be transferred, whereas under section
1404, transferor courts will often disagree on which district is the
most convenient.
There are, however, disadvantages to use of the Panel. Most
obvious is that the actual trials must be litigated in separate districts because the Panel can consolidate only for pretrial proceedings. Once the pretrial proceedings are over, each claim
must be remanded to its original district for a separate trial. Numerous trials result in duplication of effort and time in litigating
the facts. Therefore, the Panel provides only a partial solution.
The Panel is further hampered by its inability to order the transfer of related state actions, thus leaving a party to litigate some
of his claims in the state courts and the rest in the federal
courts.94 Finally, the transferee court must still apply the law of
the transferor forum and therefore must still work through the
95
conflict of laws problem.
There has been some effort to combine sections 1404 and
1407 in order to overcome the disadvantages of each. 96 The theory is that once transfer has been made pursuant to section 1407,
the transferee court transfers all cases to its courtroom under
section 1404 for trial on such issues as liability.9 7 This is advantageous because judicial economy is achieved by having all aspects of the litigation combined in one proceeding. More
importantly, the transferee judge has supervised the litigation
for a long time and may be the best qualified to conduct the trial
fused to order plaintiffs to pay their lead counsel before remand, or strike
two defendants from the claims after the transferee court granted them
summary judgment). This has lead Martin to conclude that, once transfer

is made, the transferee judge has exclusive jurisdiction.
93. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster near Silver Plume, Colorado on
October 2, 1970, 352 F. Supp. 968 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972). The aviation disaster in
Colorado involved the Witchita State University football team. Because
most of the parties lived in Kansas, the Panel transferred the action there.
The Panel also has transferred claims to the district where the most extensive discovery has occurred. In re Air Crash Disaster near Pellston, Michigan on May 9, 1970, 357 F. Supp. 1286 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973).
94. Disaster,supra note 23, at 667.
95. See generally 1 SPEISER, AVIATION TORT LAW 269 (1979).
96. For a critical commentary on this procedure, see Farrell, Multidistrict Litigation in Aviation Accident Cases, 38 J. Am L. & CoM. 159 (1972).
97. A transferee court transferred all cases to itself for all purposes
under § 1404 in In re Air Crash near Duarte, California on June 6, 1971, 357 F.
Supp. 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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because of his familiarity with the facts. 98

This technique has been criticized primarily because it has
not been expressly authorized by Congress. 99 Another criticism
is that combining sections 1404 and 1407 does not reduce the
case load because the number of claims remains the same
whether or not these two sections are used. Therefore, it is argued, there is no need to use both sections 1404 and 1407.100
Such criticism, however, fails to consider that each plaintiff has
a right to have his claim adjudicated regardless of the number of
claims; but use of sections 1404 and 1407 can eliminate some of
the duplication of effort that now exists by allowing each claim
to be litigated separately.
Admiralty Law
In some cases, there are federal grounds on which plaintiffs
may sue for recovery, thus removing the problems connected
with choice of law 10 ' or venue provisions. Basically, there are
two methods of obtaining federal question jurisdiction in domestic aviation disaster cases. 10 2 First, the plaintiff may file suit
on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction when there is an aviation
98. See Disaster,supra note 23, at 668.
99. Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1404 nor 28 U.S.C. § 1407 makes reference to the
other or any general reference to use of other sections.
100. Farrell, MultidistrictLitigationin Aviation Disaster Cases, 38 J. Am

L. &COM. 159, 167 (1972). Farrell asserts that aviation cases do not have the
complexity to warrant transfer of all claims to the transferee judge simply
because he is more familiar with the case. Therefore, the claims should go
back to their original district and the right to jury trial should control. Id.
101. Since federal law controls, uniformity of results follows.
102. The two areas of federal substantive law in aviation disaster cases
arise out of domestic law. There is, however, one action arising out of a
treaty: the Warsaw Convention, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 816 (Dec. 12, 1929)
ratified by the United States in 1934. Originally, the convention was formulated to protect the then infant airline industry. It provided for strict liability but recovery was limited to $8,300. Two later agreements, the Hague
Protocol, S. Exec. Doc. No. H, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1954) and the Montreal
Agreement, 49 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976), raised the limitation to $16,000 and
$75,000 respectively. This becomes confusing in litigation because different
limitations can apply depending on which treaty is applicable. The Convention, by its definition of international activity, may include air travel normally considered domestic because Article 1(2) focuses on points of
departure and destination. Therefore, two passengers on the same flight
may be subject to two entirely different bodies of law.
Another interesting aspect of the Convention is that the limitations
only apply to airlines and not to manufacturers. Thus, a manufacturer may
end up paying most of a plaintiffs claim. However, because the Convention
only applies to a small percentage of all aviation disasters litigated in this
country, extended discussion of the Convention is beyond the scope of this
paper. For further discussion of the Warsaw Convention and its impact on
aviation litigation, see Loggans, PersonalInjury Damages in International
Aviation Litigation: the Plaintiff's Perspective, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 541, 543

(1980).
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disaster on or over the high seas. 10 3 Second, the plaintiff may
States as a defendant under the Fedfile suit against the United
04
eral Tort Claims Act.1
If an aviation disaster occurs on or near navigable water, an
action may be litigated under admiralty law. One available action is the Death on the High Seas Act,10 5 which provides a
wrongful death action for torts committed on the high seas one
marine league 10 6 or more from shore. Congress probably did not
envision the Act's use in aviation disasters when it was enacted
in 1920.107 Nevertheless, the statute has been used in appropriate aviation disaster cases and it provides jurisdiction in federal
08
admiralty courts.
Another admiralty cause of action arose out of Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc.' 0 9 In Moragne, a death occurred on
navigable waters within Florida's territorial limits." 0 Florida's
wrongful death statute, however, did not recognize the admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness upon which the plaintiffs
claim was based."' The Court held that Congress had a strong
policy favoring recovery for wrongful death caused by breach of
a duty imposed by federal maritime law." 2 Furthermore, passage of the Death on the High Seas Act did not preclude a remedy for a wrongful death which occurred in a state's territorial
waters. 113 Therefore, the court allowed recovery for wrongful
death in admiralty law even though the death occurred outside
the provisions of the Death on the High Seas Act." 4 The hold103.
104.
infra.
105.
106.

See notes 101-135 and accompanying text infra.
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). See notes 125-135 and accompanying text
46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1976).
A marine league is a unit of distance equal to three miles. THE

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 744 (1st ed. 1969).
107. Prominski, Wrongful Death in Aviation: State, Federal and War-

saw, 15 U. MIA~M L. REv. 59, 67 (1960).
108. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249
(1970).
109. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
110. Id. at 376.
111. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1965). This case was certified to the Florida
Supreme Court specifically to determine whether the Florida wrongful
death statute allowed recovery for the admiralty concept of unseaworthiness. After reviewing the history of the act, the Florida court decided that it
did not. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 377 (1970).
112. Id. at 393.
113. Id. In other words, Congress did not legislate that a federal tort
remedy would not apply for mishaps in a state's territorial waters merely
because Congress chose not to include those waters within the Death on
the High Seas Act.
114. Id.
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ing in Moragne has been extended to aviation disaster cases. 115
Thus, Moragne provides an alternative jurisdictional basis in admiralty for an appropriate aviation disaster case.
An action based on the Moragne decision, however, must

meet the test laid out in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, Ohio.116 In Executive Jet, a jet crashed in Lake Erie
shortly after takeoff 17 on a flight from Cleveland to Portland,
Maine. 1 8 The United States Supreme Court held that a claim
arising out of an aviation disaster in navigable waters would not
lie under the Moragne rationale unless the aircraft's activity
bore a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity.119 Furthermore, absent specific legislation, there is no federal admiralty jurisdiction over aviation disaster claims arising
120
from a flight between two points within the United States.
Thus, Executive Jet has placed severe limitations on
Moragne.121
There are advantages to using admiralty jurisdiction. Since
admiralty is part of the federal system, sections 1404 and 1407
may be used to reduce duplication of litigation. In addition, the
same law is applied in all cases. Even if an admiralty action is
initiated in a state court, 2 2 it must apply the law as if the action
had been brought in the admiralty courts. 123 The major drawback to admiralty jurisdiction is that its application is severely
115. Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970). This case
arose out of the midair collision of two aircraft engaged in spotting schools
of fish. The collision occurred near enough to the Louisiana shore that the
action could not be based on the Death on the High Seas Act.
116. 409 U.S. 249 (1970).
117. Id. The accident occurred when the plane struck a flock of seagulls
and lost power shortly after takeoff.
118. From Portland, the plane was to continue to White Plains, New
York; therefore, the entire flight was to take place within the United States.
119. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249,
268 (1970). An example of a traditional maritime activity occurred in Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970), where two planes crashed
while engaged in spotting schools of fish. This was a function traditionally
performed by waterborne vessels. The Executive Jet decision reflected the
Court's desire that invocation of admiralty jurisdiction be based on historical and logical justification rather than a fortuitous event. Note, Aviation
Tort Claims-Relationshipto Traditional Maritime Activity Requiredfor
Admiralty Jurisdiction,47 Tui. L. REV. 1143, 1147 (1973).

120. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249,
274 (1970).
121. The Death on the High Seas Act appears to be unaffected by the
Executive Jet decision. Annot., 30 A.L.R. Fed. 759, 765 (1976).
122. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (1976), state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal admiralty courts for enforcement of rights conferred by
maritime law if adequate relief may be given in an action at law.
123. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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limited because few aviation disasters occur over water; 124 of
those that do, the number of claims that can be litigated under
admiralty is even smaller because of the Executive Jet decision.
The Federal Tort Claims Act
The other major substantive federal action in domestic aviation disaster litigation is the Federal Tort Claims Act. 125 The
Act provides an action against the federal government for loss of
property, personal injury or death caused by an employee of the
federal government while acting within the scope of his employment. 126 The injury must occur under circumstances such that
if the federal government were a private person, it would be liable to the plaintiff under the law where the act or omission ocand all
curred. 127 There is a two year statute of limitations
128
actions are tried by the court without a jury.
The Federal Tort Claims Act frequently provides a cause of
action in aviation disasters because of the large number of aircraft owned by the government and its control over aviation
through various agencies. 129 Furthermore, pendent jurisdiction 130 may be obtained for claims against other defendants so
that no plaintiff has to litigate one claim in state court and another in federal court. 131 Thus, the Federal Tort Claims Act has
one advantage over admiralty jurisdiction: the Act is used frequently because of the large number of claims filed against the
United States. As a result, parties in these cases can utilize sections 1404 and 1407 to reduce duplication in litigation.
124. Most aviation and hence most aviation disasters in the United States
occur within the continental borders. International aviation disasters may
occur over water, but are ruled by the Warsaw Convention. See note 102
supra.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).

126. Id.
127. Id. This causes the government to be subject to the same negligence law as private industry. If an employer forces his employees to work
to the point of fatigue, he is liable to those injured. Therefore, if the government does the same thing to its air traffic controllers, it is only fitting that
the federal government also be liable. See generally Kennelly, Claims and
Suitsfor Aviation Accidents under the FederalTort Claims Act, 16 TRIAL L.
GUIDE 1 (1972).

128. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
129. KREINDLER, supra note 21, at § 5.01(1).
130. Under pendent jurisdiction, federal courts can determine state law
claims if the state claim forms a ground of relief parallel to that of the federal claim. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
131. Douglas, supra note 40, at 439. The author argues that in aviation
disaster cases, where the United States is a defendant under federal common law, state claims may be attached through pendent jurisdiction. The
aircrash itself is the common nucleus of operative facts and consolidation
under § 1404 would meet the requirement of judicial economy.
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The Federal Tort Claims Act, however, has several problems
in aviation disaster litigation, the major one being choice of law.
At first glance, the Act appears to have its own choice of law
rule; it applies the law of the state where the negligent act or
omission took place. 132 This provision of the Act is deceptive because the United States Supreme Court has held that the Federal Tort Claims Act requires application of the whole state law,
including its choice of law rule.' 33 Since the federal courts must
apply choice of law rules as in diversity cases, the Act has the
same problems caused by modern choice of law analysis. 34 Finally, the Act is limited to claims against the government and
does not apply where the government is not a defendant in an
aviation disaster. 135 Thus, the Act is not a complete solution
since it will not apply in every aviation disaster.
Federal Common Law
A possible solution to the problems in aviation disaster lies
in the federal common law, 136 which develops by case law rather
than by statute. The application of federal common law may be
warranted in an aviation disaster because aviation is an interstate activity. 137 The interstate nature of aviation has been recognized by Congress and, through legislation such as the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958,138 Congress has imposed duties on
those who engage in aviation. 39 These duties have created in
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
133. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
134. Another problem concerns the Act's administrative claim period.
The head of each federal agency is authorized to settle tort claims up to
$25,000. Any claim above that amount may be settled but only with the written approval of the Attorney General. In order to accomplish this, one cannot sue unless the claim is first presented to the agency. Should the claim
be denied or the agency fail to respond within six months, the claimant may
then file suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). This requirement subjects the plaintiff to the perils of bureaucracy. Kennelly, Claims and Suits for Aviation
Accidents under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 16 TRIAL L. GUmE 1, 4 (1972).

This tends to increase rather then decrease litigation since the various
agency heads tend not to be willing to settle substantial claims against the
government. Id.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
136. Although Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), held that there
is no federal common law, the truth is, there has always been a federal common law. Minerlider v. La Plata River &Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938), decided on the same day as Erie, applied a federal rule in regard to
apportionment of water in an interstate stream. See also Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), notes 109-115 and accompanying text
supra, which recognized a cause of action under general common law.
137. Comment, Conflict of Laws--Desirabilityof Federal Legislation in

CommercialAviation, 18 VAIN. L. REV. 1632 (1965).
138. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
139. Disaster,supra note 23, at 678.
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passengers a federal right to air safety. 140 Congress, however,
failed to provide a federal remedy to protect this right, deferring
14 1
instead to the state courts.
Air carriers should conform their behavior to the duties imposed on them. Air carriers, however, can do this only if they
know what behavior is expected. While the Federal Aviation
Act and the regulations formulated thereunder give air carriers
some idea of expected behavior, the various state laws create
uncertainty. Because of the large number of plaintiffs from different districts and states involved in most aviation litigation,
there is confusion over which law to apply and conflicting results have occurred. Thus, the mass of conflicting laws has
failed to protect the federal right to air safety and some kind of
uniformity is necessary.
When there is a need for national uniformity, state and local
interests must yield. 142 This need has led some to argue for the
application of federal common law to preempt state law and provide uniformity. 143 By use of precedent, the federal courts over
time can provide a uniform body of law under which aviation
disasters can be litigated. As federal actions are developed by
case law, the courts will be able to assume jurisdiction and use
sections 1404 and 1407 to reduce the strain of multidistrict litigation. Therefore, federal common law has great potential as a solution to the problems of litigating aviation disasters.
140. Id.
141. Id.

The Federal Aviation Act provides: "Nothing in this chapter

shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law
or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976).
142. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). The court
stated:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it ....
Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed
to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
Id. at 230.
143. See Federal Common Law, supra note 7, and Judicial Solution,
supra note 2, for commentary arguing in favor of the use of federal common
law in aviation disaster litigation. See also Annot., 31 A.L.R. Fed. 270 (1977)
for case law recognizing actions based on violation of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958. But see Prewitt, Federal Common Law of Aviation and the Erie

Doctrine, 40 J. Am L. & COM. 652 (1974) (arguing that federal common law
cannot be applied in aviation disasters until the Supreme Court reviews the

Erie doctrine). See also Note, The Decline of the Implied Cause of Action
Continued: The Third Circuit Construes the Federal Aviation Act, 31
RUTGERs L. REV. 41 (1977) (discussion of the reluctance of courts to use

federal common law); and Disaster,supra note 23 (critical commentary on
using federal common law).
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There is authority for extending federal common law to aviation disaster cases. In Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp.,1" the court
held that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958145 and the regulations
promulgated thereunder imposed a duty on the defendant airline to perform with the highest degree of care. 146 Furthermore,
breach of this duty created a cause of action in favor of the one
injured or damaged by the death of a person in an aviation disaster. 147 The court came to this conclusion by looking to the various provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 which
emphasizes safety;"'1
the reference to safety undoubtedly
meant the safety of passengers. Although the Gabel court created a federal cause of action, it also applied the state rule on
damages. 149 Thus, in and of itself, Gabel does not provide a sufficient basis for solving aviation disaster litigation problems
since it applied state law. 50
A later case, Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines,'5 ' may have solved
the problem in Gabel by holding that the federal rule of contribution and indemnity is applicable to actions arising out of midair collisions. 152 The power of the Kohr court to fashion a rule of
decision stems from Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States.153 In
Clearfield, the United States Supreme Court held that federal
courts could apply a federal common law rule over an appropriate state law where there is a "paramount federal interest." A
paramount federal interest can arise either from the need to
prevent state law from impeding the function of the federal system 54 or from the need for uniformity. 155 Kohr appears to have
relied on both tests since it found federal preemption in avia144. 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
145. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
146. Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
147. Id. at 615.
148. Id. at 615-17.
149. Id. at 623.
150. Gabel supplied a federal cause of action but failed to apply federal
law. In so doing, Gabel leaves a problem for subsequent cases. In these
cases, the courts must decide which state law to apply. Under modern
choice of law analysis, this may be difficult to determine in litigation involving multiple plaintiffs. See notes 16-52 and accompanying text supra. Similarly, because state laws vary, there will probably be inconsistent results.
Since uniformity of law is one of the reasons for initially applying a federal
cause of action, Gabel fails to provide a complete solution to the problems
involved in aviation disaster cases. Judicial Solution, supra note 2, at 242.
151. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974).
152. Id. at 403.
153. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
154. Id. at 366.
155. Id. at 367.
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tion 156 and the need for a single rule of contribution and indemnity. 157 Kohr is important because the court recognized that a
federal court has the competence to fashion or select a rule instead of relying on existing state law' 58 as required by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 15 9 Kohr, however, provides authority for

applying federal law over state law in aviation disasters only in
the federal courts. While applying federal law does provide uniformity, Kohr does not help a plaintiff who cannot gain entry to
160
the federal courts.
Because Gabel found a cause of action based on federal
common law and Kohr applied a federal rule of decision, the two
cases could form a possible basis for all aviation disaster cases
to be tried under federal common law. Gabel insures access to a
federal forum by recognizing an implied cause of action in favor
of those injured in an aviation disaster;161 thus, a plaintiff can
sue under federal question jurisdiction. 162 The Kohr decision
provides the next step by allowing courts to decide the applica163
ble rules of law in cases arising under that implied action.
Read together, the two cases provide federal courts with jurisdiction through an implied cause of action and thereafter allow
all aspects of the litigation to be governed by federal common
64
law.'
156. Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1974) (federal
preemption in aviation meant that state law could not impinge on federal
government control over aviation).

157. Id. The conflicting rules of contribution and indemnity were replaced by a single rule, thereby creating uniformity.

158. Judicial Solution, supra note 2, at 243.
159. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
160. Judicial Solution, supra note 2, at 243.
161. Id. In so doing, the Gabel court was following the lead of previous
cases by implying a civil remedy for violation of a federal regulatory statute.
The theory is that when the enforcement provisions of a statute are inadequate to fulfill the strong social policy embodied in the statute, the courts
should fill in the gaps by allowing private enforcement through an implied
cause of action. Comment, Implied Causes of Action: A New Analytical
Framework, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 141, 166 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Analytical Framework]. Stated another way: "Where a federal right is created by
a statute, a federal remedy must be fashioned ... to protect that right." Id.
at 152. Failure of the court to do this in effect would condone the conduct
considered wrongful. Id. at 143.
162. A federal question is defined as a genuine controversy which arises
under the Constitution of the United States or a United States law or treaty
and is amenable to judicial solution. BALLENrINE'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 462 (3d
ed. 1969). By using an implied cause of action as a remedy to'protect a federal right, the courts are allowing access to the federal courts under federal
question jurisdiction. Therefore, lack of diversity will not bar plaintiffs from
litigating in federal courts.
163. JudicialSolution, supra note 2, at 242.
164. Id.
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There is doubt, however, whether federal common law will
be utilized by the federal courts in the future. 165 In the past,
decisions such as Gabel have justified implied remedies where
there is a need for national uniformity or it is necessary to grant
relief for the invasion of a federal right. 166 This right must arise
from a federal rather than a state statutory prohibition. 167 However, the United States Supreme Court, in Cort v. Ash 168 established four criteria for finding a common law cause of action:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted'.

. .

. Second, is there any indication of legis-

lative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create a remedy or to
deny one ....

Third, is it consistent with the underlying scheme to

imply such a remedy for the plaintiff... [ IF]
inally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of states, so that it would be inappropriate
to infer a
169
cause of action based solely on federal law.
Obviously, the Supreme Court has restricted use of the implied cause of action doctrine. 170 Cort was the first decision to
require that an implied cause of action meet the requirements of
all the previously formulated tests. 171 Whether federal causes
of action, including recognition of an implied cause of action
under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, will be recognized in the
future is in doubt.
Application of the four Cort tests to the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958172 casts doubt on its usefulness in aviation disaster
litigation. For instance, the second test requires that there be a
legislative intent to create a remedy for the plaintiff. Although
Congress has not explicitly denied a cause of action for torts
based on the Act, silence by Congress has lately been construed
165. See Conklin, supra note 13, at 480.
166. Federal Common Law, supra note 7, at 1088.
167. Id.

168. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
169. Id. at 78 (emphasis in the original).
170. See generally Analytical Framework,supra note 161.
171. See Note, The Decline of the Implied Private Cause of Action Continued. The Third Circuit Construes the FederalAviation Act, 31 RUTGERS L.

REV. 41, 53 (1978). Actually, Cort only continued the trend of two earlier
cases, National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,

414 U.S. 453 (1974) and Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U.S. 412 (1975) which applied two of the first three Cort tests. The fourth

test was used for the first time in Cort.
172. Of all the statutes concerning aviation, an implied cause of action for
aviation disasters is most likely to be found in the Federal Aviation Act of

1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976). This Act set up the Federal Aviation Administration which is charged with promoting air safety through issuing
and enforcing regulations. 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976). See Gabel v. Hughes Air
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (finding an implied cause of action
based on the Federal Aviation Act). See also notes 144-150 supra.
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as denying the existence of an implied cause of action. 173 An
even stronger argument is that the Savings Clause 174 of the Act,
which allows the continued existence of common law or statu175
tory remedies, is evidence that state law should apply.
Previously, courts would apply whichever one of the Cort
tests that fit the facts. 176 The Supreme Court, however, in Cort
used all four tests to determine whether an implied cause of action existed. Therefore, in the future, courts must apply all the
Cort tests to decide if an implied cause of action will be allowed.
Furthermore, cases following Cort have either made the Cort
173. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974). Applied the rule of construction that inclusion of one
thing implies exclusion of another. The court held that for a statute to include remedies other then those enumerated, there must be clear evidence
of legislative intent. Id. at 458.
174. 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976) provides that "[n othing contained in this
chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to
such remedies."
175. Douglas, supra note 40, at 447. As to the other three Cort tests, only
the first is likely to be satisfied in determining whether an implied cause of
action should be allowed. This test requires the plaintiff to belong to the
class for whose special benefit the legislation was enacted. There is little
doubt that passengers in aviation activity are members of the class for
whose benefit the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was enacted. The predominant emphasis on safety in the Act indicates an intention to establish rights
for passengers. This is conceded even by those who criticize use of the federal common law to create a cause of action. Id. at 447.
Application of the remaining two tests to the Act raises doubt whether
they would be satisfied. The third Cort test asks if recognizing an implied
cause of action is consistent with the underlying scheme of the Act. Since
the Act emphasizes safety, implying a cause of action for failure to follow
the standards set by the Act is consistent with the Act's purpose and promotes its goals. See also JudicialSolution, supra note 2, at 248-49. See gen-

erally Douglas, supra note 40 (implying a cause of action under the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 would promote the statute's economic purposes).
Yet, it has been argued that Congress's purpose in the Act was air
safety regulation and that purpose is adequately protected by the federal
aviation program. Nor does state tort law interfere with the functioning of
the federal aviation program. FederalCommon Law, supra note 7, at 1099.
Moreover, there must be a specific intent to occupy a given subject matter.
New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1975).
The final test asks if the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to
state law in an area basically the concern of states so that it would be inappropriate to infer a federal cause of action. Although Congress has enacted
wrongful death statutes (see, e.g., the Death on the High Seas Act, notes
101-124 and accompanying text supra), wrongful death actions are traditionally a matter of state concern and the federal courts have shown an extreme
reluctance to enter into areas of traditional state concern. See, e.g., Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs had
an adequate state remedy for wrongful death).
176. See Note, The Decline of the Implied Private Cause of Action Continued: The Third Circuit Construes the Federal Aviation Act, 31 RUTGERS L.
REv. 41, 47 (1978).
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judiciary's
tests more restrictive 177 or denied altogether the
178
competence in finding an implied cause of action.
The elimination of implied actions has serious consequences for the use of federal common law in aviation disaster
cases. In order to apply the federal common law, a federal cause
of action must be found. Only then can the court fashion federal
rules to insure uniformity in the litigation of aviation disasters. 179 While the Gabel18 0 case did find a federal cause of action
implicit in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, that decision predated Cort. The federal courts will apply the Cort tests to decide
whether or not Gabel should be followed. 181 Since it is likely
that one of the Cort tests will not be fulfilled, use of federal common law would not be an adequate solution to the problems of
182
aviation disaster litigation.
In addition to the Cort tests, other problems exist in applying federal common law to aviation disaster cases. For example,
issues such as determining the proper beneficiaries may still
have to be tried under state law. 183 Another and more serious
problem is that, by forming a new area of federal common law,
uncertainty will be the norm. 8 4 Until an issue reaches the
courts, it is unknown what rules will be formulated and applied.
177. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (denied an implied cause of action by holding that the primary beneficiaries of
the statute must be determined from the face of the statute in order to fulfill
the first Cort test).

178. In one case, Touche Ross &Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the
Court stated that it was not the federal courts' duty to fill in legislative voids
in a statutory scheme. Id. at 579. For a further discussion of elimination by
the Supreme Court of implied causes of action, see Analytical Framework,
supra note 161.
179. While it is true that Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400
(7th Cir. 1974), applied a federal rule of contribution in a state action, the
federal courts' reluctance to impinge upon traditional matters of state law
makes it difficult for them to follow Kohr absent a federal action.
180. Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
181. See Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976)
where the court refused to recognize an implied cause of action based on
violations of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 for a breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and for strict
liability in tort. The court held that the first and fourth Cort tests were not
met. Id. at 460. See also Miree v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 433 U.S. 25
(1977) in which the Court refused to extend the federal common law to a
suit involving a breach of contract with the Federal Aviation Administration. The Court held that the federal government's interest in safety was
not a sufficient reason to displace state law when there was no showing that
the state law was inadequate to protect the federal interests involved. Id. at
31.

182. See notes 16-60 and accompanying text supra.
183. Judicial Solution, supra note 2, at 257 (certain issues such as who
are proper beneficiaries are tied to state rather than federal law).
184. FederalCommon Law, supra note 7, at 1104.
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Conflicts may develop between districts or circuits and the disputes will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court, 185 further
strengthening the conclusion that federal common law cannot
solve the problems of aviation disaster litigation.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF
AVIATION DISASTER CASES

Previous Attempts
Since existing federal and state law does not effectively
solve the problems of aviation disaster litigation, the only remaining solution is for Congress to enact federal legislation governing aviation disaster litigation. This idea is not novel and has
been tried on at least three previous occasions. 18 6 The first attempt, the Holtzoff Bill, 1 87 sought to establish exclusive federal
jurisdiction over any civil action arising out of the operation of
any aircraft in interstate or foreign commerce. 188 Consolidation
was to be achieved under section 1404189 by allowing a district
court to transfer any civil action arising out of an aviation disaster to another district for determination of all common issues of
fact or law. The bill left formation of substantive law to the
courts of the United States through application of federal common law. 190

There were two major problems with this legislation. First,
was
both too broad and too narrow in its definition of aviation
it
activity. The definition of aircraft applied not only to interstate
carriers, but also to private aircraft that crossed state lines. At
the same time, however, air carriers operating intrastate were
not affected.' 9 ' Second, the Holtzoff Bill called for the formulation of a federal common law, thus incorporating all the disad185. Id.

186. The "Holtzoff Bill," S. 3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); the "Admi-

ralty Bill," S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); and the "Tydings Bill," S. 961,

91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). These three bills have generated the most commentary. There were, however, earlier equally unsuccessful attempts. H.R.
532, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 4912, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); and
S. 1904, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). See Note, Uniform State Aviation Liability Legislation, 1948 Wis. L. REV. 356, for discussion of H.R. 4912 and of a
report by Edward C. Sweeny for the Civil Aeronautics Board on the feasibility of a federal aviation liability statute.
187. S. 3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The bill was called the Holtzoff

Bill after its drafter, Judge Alexander Holtzoff of the Washington D.C. District Court. Aircraft Crash Litigation, supra note 47, at 1057.
188. S. 3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1968).
189. Id. at § 2.
190. Id. at § 4.
191. See Aircraft Crash Litigation, supra note 47.
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vantages of applying federal common law. 192
The Admiralty Bill was introduced in the same session as
the Holtzoff Bill and, while more complex, was intended to accomplish the same goals. 193 It provided jurisdiction for any injury or death caused by any tortious act arising out of aviation or
space activity. 19 4 Like its predecessor, consolidation was provided under section 1404. However, unlike the Holtzoff Bill, the
transfer was to the district either where the largest number of
cases were pending or where the first action was filed. The Admiralty Bill also differed from the Holtzoff Bill in that the normal venue provisions of section 1404 did not apply. 195 Thus, the
transferee district was not required to be a district where the
action might have been brought. The substantive law, like that
of its predecessor, was to develop from federal common law;
however, it was also subject to any other applicable federal statute, but not state statutes or admiralty law. This had the effect
of preempting state law and removing any future claims from
the admiralty courts. In these cases, the new legislation was
196
controlling.
197
During the following session of Congress, the Tydings Bill

was introduced and has generated much commentary. 198 It differed from previous legislative proposals in providing for both
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction. The federal courts would
have exclusive jurisdiction over certain enumerated aviation activities. 199 At the same time, concurrent jurisdiction was provided for an action arising out of ground activity or any aviation
192. The bill may also have cut into the authority of the Warsaw Convention, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 816 (Oct. 12, 1929). Aircraft Crash Litigation,
supra note 47, at 1058-59. See note 102 supra on the Warsaw Convention.

193. S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1969). The bill was patterned after
the Death on the High Seas Act, notes 101-108 and accompanying text
supra. It was a much more complex bill because the drafters attempted to
fit it into existing law. Aircraft Crash Litigation, supra note 47, at 1059.
194. S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1969).
195. Id. at § 2.
196. Id. at § 5. The drafters of the bill felt that the legislation had to be
broad in order to regulate interstate commerce effectively. Because of criticism that the statute was overbroad, a compromise bill, S. 4089, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968) was drafted. This bill limited jurisdiction to commercial activity. The compromise died when the session ended without action being
taken. Aircraft Crash Litigation, supra note 47, at 1062.
197. S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1969).
198. The origins and purpose of the bill are explained by its drafter in
Tydings, supra note 48. For a critical analysis of S. 961, see Comment, Federal Courts-ProposedAircraft Crash LitigationLegislation,35

215 (1970).
199. S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1969).

Mo. L. REV.
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activity not covered by the exclusive jurisdiction section.20 0
Thus, jurisdiction sections in the Tydings Bill differed from previous legislative attempts by defining specific activities giving
rise to jurisdiction, thereby avoiding the criticism of being too
broad.
The Tydings Bill called for a uniform body of federal law
governing all civil actions arising out of aviation activity, thus
preempting state law.20 1 The only time state law could be considered was when the law of the decedent's domicile could be
determined without inconvenience and would not thwart the
purposes of the legislation. In such cases, the law of the domito determine the beneficiaries in a wrongcile could be utilized
20 2
ful death action.
A major difference in this bill was the method of consolidation. In the Tydings Bill, all cases arising out of an aviation disaster were to be consolidated by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation. 20 3 The Panel would be authorized 2to°4
transfer all actions to any district for any and all purposes.
Thus, the bill had neither the venue provisions of section 1404,
nor a mechanical test like that of the Admiralty Bill. Rather, the
test was a flexible one of fairness and convenience. By using the
Panel, the Tydings Bill also provided one body to determine
which district would serve as the transferee district and thereby
avoided conflicts over which district was the proper transferee
district.
The bill was criticized on several grounds, some dealing
with specifics of the act such as the statute of limitations. 20 5 Its
main problems, however, were the general provisions. For instance, the standard of liability was left to the judiciary to formulate. Because the rules of law were so uncertain, settlement
20 6
would have been hampered, leading to extended litigation.
200. Id. Such activity specifically included the flight, takeoff or landing of

large aircraft (weighing more then 12,500 pounds), high-performance aircraft (jet or turbine powered jet) or public aircraft (aircraft owned by the
United States for use in research and development).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See notes 88-95 and accompanying text supra.
204. S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969).
205. The one year statute of limitations was criticized for being too short.
Comment, Federal Courts-ProposedAircraft Crash LitigationLegislation,
35 Mo. L. REv. 215, 221-22 (1970). The contributory negligence rule was to be
the rule as it existed among the majority of the states. Criticism fell in two
categories: the difficulty of determining the contributory negligence law of
the majority of states and the use of contributory negligence rather than
comparative negligence.
206. Id. at 223. Later legislation similar to the Tydings Bill was introduced. H.R. 231, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). It contemplated the develop-
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A New Comprehensive Act
Previous legislative proposals attempted to solve two
problems of litigating aviation disaster cases: reducing the
strain on the judicial system by consolidating claims and providing a federal cause of action by which all claims would be litigated under a uniform law. These proposals, however, were
concerned mostly with providing jurisdiction and consolidating
actions. As a result, they left the substantive body of law to be
developed by the courts. Some supporters of the proposals felt
that this presented no problem because federal judges often decide state law without any guiding precedent; therefore, formulating a federal common law would not present an
insurmountable obstacle. 20 7 Nevertheless, much conflict would
arise which would have to be settled at the appellate levels,
leading to increased litigation. The parties, uncertain of their liability, would seldom be willing to settle, and would be more
likely to appeal.
The logical conclusion is a new law based on previous attempts but going farther. Such a new law would be a comprehensive federal aviation tort liability statute covering major
substantive points of law. These sections would include standards of liability, standing provisions, and recovery rules. 20 8 As
a result, the law would provide certainty to the parties while at
the same time enabling the federal courts to develop a body of
common law, since no statute would be able to cover every point
of substantive law. A statute can, however, convey to parties
what is expected of them and what will happen to them if they
fail to conform. The new statute can provide a uniform foundation, giving the courts direction in the development of the new
law. The parties would know the standards of conduct, and lawyers would be able to counsel clients as to liability, defenses,
and the advisability of settlement. Therefore, such a comprehensive law would provide certainty in litigation and promote
judicial economy by defining the standards used to determine
20 9
liability.
ment of a federal common law subject to other federal statutes and treaties.
Also, § 1407 was utilized to reduce the amount of litigation and provide for
nationwide subpoena power. See Douglas, supra note 40, for a discussion of
this bill.
207. Douglas, supra note 40, at 435.
208. Other possible provisions include sections dealing with service of
process (such as nationwide service of process, since aviation disaster litigation involves many parties from all across the country), a statute of limitations, types of damages, definitions, contribution and indemnity.
209. Such a law may even reduce costs to passengers. If litigation costs
go down, these savings may be passed on to the consumer. Even more ben-
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The threshhold question is whether Congress has the power
to enact a federal aviation liability statute. Traditionally, remedies under tort law have been tied to the states and their individual social policies. 2 10 This view of tort law has caused
opposition to past legislative attempts. 211 In part, the argument
is based on the tenth amendment. 212 Commercial aviation, however, is interstate in nature. More than any other mode of transportation, aviation continually crosses state lines. Furthermore,
the federal government has already preempted the field of aviation and excluded state law except in tort remedies. 2 13 The
large number of passengers flying by common carriers creates
enough interstate commerce that Congress can base the law on
214
its commerce power.
The need for uniformity in all aspects of aviation activity
(including litigation) is sufficient justification for exercise of the
commerce power. It seems incongruous for tort remedies in aviation to remain tied to state law, especially when the varying
state laws have caused such problems. Therefore, while tort actions are traditionally part of state law, the overriding federal
interest in aviation should control in passage of an aviation liability statute.
The next step is assuring access to the federal courts by providing for subject matter jurisdiction. 2 15 This can be accomplished in several ways. One method is creation of a federal
cause of action for aviation tort liability; the parties could then
base jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1231.216 Since a controversy arising under a federal law would be involved, diversity problems
eficial, insurance companies do not have to assume the worst scenerio for
liability as they do now.
210. Disaster,supra note 23, at 663.
211. Conklin, supra note 13, at 480.
212. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 'The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people."
213. Disaster,supra note 23, at 675.
214. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 'The Congress shall have power * * *
[t]o regulate Commerce ...." One Supreme Court case has suggested that
Congress could constitutionally base an aviation liability statute on the
commerce power. In Executive Jet, Inc. v. Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249, 274
(1972), the Court said: "If federal uniformity is the desired goal with respect to claims arising from aviation accidents, Congress is free under the
Commerce Clause to enact legislation applicable to all such accidents,
whether occurring on land or water, and adopted to the specific characteristics of air commerce."
215. BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTrONARY 691 (3d ed. 1969).
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) provides: 'The district courts shall have jurisdiction in all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy .. .arises
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
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would be eliminated. 217 Another method is to create a separate
jurisdiction section specifically granting jurisdiction to the federal courts, similar to the provisions granting
to district courts
218
the power to hear cases in admiralty.
The best method is for Congress to create a separate jurisdictional statute covering aviation activity. One important advantage is that the statute could define exactly what cases are to
be covered exclusively by the law. In past legislative attempts,
the jurisdiction sections tended to be overbroad and encompass
activities that were not necessary in a federal aviation liability
statute. 219 An overbroad definition causes problems because it
includes activities unconnected with the need for federal
legislation.
One such activity is private aviation. 220 Private aviation disasters involve a small number of persons and present no real
strain on the judicial system because there are not enough parties to cause multidistrict litigation problems. In fact, in private
aviation cases, the flexibility of modern choice of law analysis
outweighs its difficulties since there are usually few factors and
issues to be considered. On the other hand, aviation disaster
cases involving commercial aviation should be included in the
aviation tort statute. These types of accidents create most of the
problems of aviation disaster litigation, i.e., the strain on the judicial system caused by multidistrict
litigation and the difficul22 1
ties of choice of law analysis.
217. Douglas, supra note 40, at 432.
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
219. See generally Comment, Federal Courts-ProposedAircraft Crash
LitigationLegislation, 35 Mo. L. REv. 215 (1970). For example, in the Tyd-

ings Bill, any ground activity incidental to the aviation activity could be litigated under the statute. Carried to its logical conclusion, this could include
a medical malpractice claim by a plaintiff for treatment of the injuries he
received from the aviation activity. Id. at 223. A better method would be to
include any ground activity incidental to the operation of aviation activity.
This covers incidents truly connected to an aviation disaster case such as
negligence in maintenance or in the control tower. On the other hand, it
avoids those incidents which are tenuously connected to the aviation disaster such as the above cited medical malpractice example.
220. Private aviation, also known as general aviation, includes all civil
aviation except for flights operated by common carriers. Private aviation
ranges from small propeller planes to the type of jet liners used by common
carriers; activities range from corporations using jets for carrying personnel
and freight to cropdusting and advertising. Kennelly, Aviation Law: Domestic Air Travel--A BriefDiagnosisand Prognosis,56 CHI. B. REc. 248, 262

(1975). In 1978, there were 186,600 private aircraft flying in the United States
and one out of every three travellers went by private aircraft. U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Oct. 9, 1978, at 45.

221. In private aviation, the number of passengers is usually so small
that there are fewer contacts to be analyzed for choice of law purposes.
Therefore, it is more likely that the state where the accident occurred would
have the dominant interest in the litigation.
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Congress can narrow the scope of the jurisdiction section by
listing the specific events that give rise to jurisdiction. 222 By using this method, as opposed to a general definition, the statute
would involve only that aviation activity which Congress determines gives rise to problems in tort litigation. Furthermore, by
granting the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over these activities, Congress could insure that there is no state involvement. Congress might also want to follow the Tydings Bill's
example by providing a general clause allowing concurrent jurisdiction over all other aviation activity. 223 This would provide
a basis for federal jurisdiction in circumstances which indicate
that jurisdiction over private aviation activity should be in federal rather than state court.224 Thus, Congress would provide
flexibility by allowing all aviation disaster cases access to the
federal courts.
Having provided for access to the federal courts, Congress
would next have to determine the substantive law under the act.
An aviation tort statute must balance the interests of plaintiffs,
defendants, the courts, and the public at large. Otherwise, to
skew the law too much toward one side would lead to immediate
opposition from the other side, harming all parties. Balancing is
vital in the specifics of the act because it is in these areas that
the law can favor one side or the other. For instance, in setting
the statute of limitations, Congress must determine the optimum time in which claims have to be filed. If the limitation is
too short, the results would be harsh to plaintiffs who might not
have enough time to fie their claims. Conversely, if the time
limitation is too long, defendants might be exposed unfairly to
stale claims. While determination of the specifics of the legislation must be left to Congress, a general framework for the legis222. Congress has used this technique before. Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1976), Congress specifically defined interstate commerce to include certain activities of the hotel and restaurant
business in order to eliminate racial discrimination in those areas. The
Supreme Court upheld the validity of this scheme in Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
223. Concurrent jurisdiction was provided for any aviation activity not
specifically falling under the section granting jurisdiction. S. 961, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. § 1373(d) (1969). The bill also provided concurrent jurisdiction
with the admiralty courts over three specifically enumerated air activities:
large aircraft, high performance aircraft, and public aircraft.
224. For example, assume two private aircraft, each with two passengers,
collide and each of the four passengers resides in a different state. They
collide in a fifth state. There are enough different states involved that leaving the parties to the jurisdiction of state courts could lead to confusion and
hardship. If federal jurisdiction is available, however, the parties can enjoy
the advantages that the aviation liability statute would offer, such as 28
U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
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lation can be suggested that will remove the problems of
aviation disaster litigation.
Whenever new legislation is enacted, the question arises
whether existing legislation dealing with the same activity has
been replaced. Obviously, Congress will not want to replace
laws such as the Federal Aviation Act of 1958;225 yet other laws,
such as state laws governing aviation tort liability, must be replaced to insure uniformity. Congress, through a two step process, can clearly define what laws are or are not replaced. First,
a general section could provide that, unless the statute expressly states otherwise, no existing law would be replaced.
Second, Congress could state what specific laws would be replaced by the aviation liability statute, thereby defining the
boundaries within which federal common law would develop.
Otherwise, the danger exists that the aviation liability statute
would be extended into areas where it does not belong.
The aviation liability statute should replace varying state
laws that now govern aviation disaster litigation. Congress can
accomplish this by declaring all state laws inapplicable to the
litigation of aviation disasters within the exclusive jurisdictional
provisions of the statute. 226 This would provide much of the uniformity needed in litigating aviation disasters. Uniformity, however, also requires replacement of some federal laws, such as
admiralty tort law, 227 including the Death on the High Seas
Act, 228 and the Federal Tort Claims Act.229 A major problem of

the Federal Tort Claims Act in aviation disaster cases is its
choice of law rule.230 The Act relies on state choice of law rules

and thus fails to provide the uniformity that federal law usually
does. Instead, the Act incorporates the problem of uncertainty
that results from modern choice of law analysis. If the Federal
Tort Claims Act is amended so that the provisions of the aviation liability statute control, the choice of law problems will be
eliminated because all cases will be decided under a uniform
law.

23 1

225. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
226. The Tydings Bill, S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) declared that
there is a uniform body of federal law "exclusive of any other law."
227. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970);

notes 109-115 and accompanying text supra. Because of the small number
of aviation disaster cases that fall within admiralty jurisdiction, it makes
sense to remove all these cases and place them under the proposed act's
coverage so that all aviation disasters are litigated under the same law.
228. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1976).

229. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
230. See notes 16-52 and accompanying text supra.

231. Congress may want to keep other aspects of the Federal Tort Claims
Act intact. For instances, Congress may still want to use the administrative
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Next, Congress must insure uniformity by developing the
appropriate standard of liability. A standard of liability will create both greater certainty for the parties and a starting point for
developing federal law. Yet, the need to develop a federal common law will not be as critical because the parties will be able to
determine their liability with reasonable certainty. From these
standards, the parties can prepare for trial and negotiate
settlements.
In past legislative attempts, if Congress defined standards at
all, only one standard was developed. Generally, the choice was
between either a negligence standard or an absolute liability
standard. 232 In conformity with modem tort law, however, different standards of liability should be used for different forms of
conduct, 233 depending on the culpability involved. The negli-

gent defendant should not be held to the same standard as one
guilty of reckless misconduct; neither should be held to the
strict liability standard of product manufacturers. 234 Fairness
requires that Congress provide liability standards which vary
235
with the claim involved.
waiting period. See note 134 supra. Congress can continue to provide that
aviation disasters fall within the Act's provisions, but amend the act so that

its choice of law rule does not apply to any claim to which the aviation liability statute applies. Thus, if an aviation disaster falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the aviation liability statute, the substantive law would be
governed by the aviation liability statute but all other aspects would be gov-

erned by the Federal Tort Claims Act.

232. Comment, Uniform State Aviation Liability Legislation, 1948 Wis.
L. REV. 356, 363.
233. Prosser divides tort law into three standards of liability: intent of
the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff's interests, negligence, and
strict liability. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 26-7 (4th ed.
1971). For an intentional or negligent tort action, there must be an invasion
of some right or breach of, or failure to perform, some duty. 74 Am.JUR.2d
Torts § 12 (1974). However, there is also a strict liability standard under
which "the defendant is held liable in the absence of any intent which the
law finds wrongful, or any negligence, very often for reasons of policy."
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 27 (4th ed. 1971).
234. Reckless misconduct imports knowledge that injury is likely to
spring from the act whereas mere negligence involves breach of duty. 74
AM. JuR. 2d Torts § 22 (1974). In strict liability, however, social policy requires the defendant to make good the harm to others which results from a
desirable industrial activity that contains a strong possibility of causing
harm to others. Id. at § 14.
235. An alternative to using standards of liability exists: a law that allows recovery regardless of fault. Under such a "no-fault" scheme, the defendant is liable for any injury that occurs as a result of aviation activity,
but the plaintiffs recovery is limited to a maximum amount set by law. This
is the type of scheme used under the Warsaw Convention. See note 102
supra.
However, these types of schemes, for example the Warsaw Convention,
tend to be very unpopular because the recovery limitation is so low. See
Loggans, Personal Injury Damages in International Aviation Litigation..
the Plaintiff's Perspective, 13 J. MAP. L REV. 541 (1980). In addition, be-
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In addition to providing for uniformity, Congress should
provide for reduction of the strain on the judicial system. The
best solution would be consolidation through section 1407,236 but
removing the shortcomings of that section by providing for
transfer for all purposes instead of just for pretrial purposes.
This way, all aspects of the litigation can be consolidated with-

out regard to venue provisions. Also, one judicial entity decides
which district will serve as the transferee court. Therefore, expanded use of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation will

insure judicial economy by ending needless duplication of work
and providing one entity to determine the proper transferee
court.
Thus, under the proposed framework, the aviation tort liability statute can solve the existing problems of litigating aviation disasters. The strain on the judicial system is reduced
through expanded use of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The conflicting results and uncertainty caused by varying state and federal laws are removed by providing a uniform
law. Choice of law problems are also eliminated by the creation
of a uniform law. This uniformity is insured by defining the
standards of liability to be used in litigating aviation disasters.
Thus, the parties can determine the extent of their liability and
the courts have a starting point to develop federal common law.
Once Congress has set the standards of liability, it can deal with
other specifics of the legislation such as the statute of limita237
tions or the proper beneficiaries in a wrongful death action.
cause no fault schemes tend to be so controversial, such a scheme in a federal statute is unlikely to pass Congress. Comment, Uniform State Aviation
Liability Legislation, 1948 WIs. L. Rav. 356, 370.
236. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1977). Another possible solution for consolidation
would be a class action provision. However, unless FED. R. Crv. P. 23 is
amended, either by the aviation liability statute or separately, class actions
cannot be used to reduce the strain of multidistrict litigation. See Annot., 28
A.L.R. Fed. 719 (1976).
237. Congress must balance the interests of both sides in the area of punitive damages. Plaintiffs will want punitive damages included in cases
where the defendant was guilty of reckless or willful misconduct and knew
that some danger existed which could cause harm. In such cases, punitive
damages are warranted, not as compensation, but as a deterrent to future
misconduct. In effect, the plaintiff acts as a private attorney general in punishing the conduct of the defendant.
On the other hand, defendants would want punitive damages to be excluded, fearing unlimited liability. It is possible that a jury would award an
amount that could bankrupt a corporation. In addition, in an aviation disaster, with so many plaintiffs requesting punitive damages, the total recovery
of all plaintiffs could financially ruin a defendant.
Should Congress decided that punitive damages belong in the aviation
liability statute, there is a method which could balance both sides' interests
and accomplish the goal of punitive damages. All plaintiffs who request punitive damages would belong to a special class and if they were awarded, a
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CONCLUSION

A survey of existing statutes, case law, and commentary
shows that, in all areas but tort litigation, the federal government has exclusive control over aviation activity. 238 Conflicting
state tort laws and modern conflict of laws analysis cause an insurmountable problem in aviation disaster litigation. Furthermore, with the large number of claims arising out of aviation
disasters, an excessive burden is placed on the courts.
Existing solutions do not provide relief for the problems of
aviation disaster litigation. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation does not go far enough because of its limited application. Other solutions such as admiralty jurisdiction involve too
small a number of cases to be of any use in solving aviation disaster problems. Still other solutions such as federal common
law create as many problems as they solve.
Given the state of aviation activity today, it is in the interests of all parties and the courts to urge the enactment of a comprehensive federal aviation liability act. Previous attempts did
not work because they created their own problems or incorporated existing problems. By enacting a comprehensive statute,
Congress can insure certainty in litigation, yet provide room for
courts to maneuver and develop new law. In addition, the act
will save time and avoid needless duplication of effort by providing for consolidation of claims for all purposes. Naturally, in the
interest of fairness, the comprehensive act must balance the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, the courts, and public policy at
large.
Unfortunately lawyers try to solve problems by adding to
existing mechanisms. 239 While this method works to a degree,
there are times when something new has to be utilized. Aviation disaster litigation is one such area in the law today. The
time has come for a comprehensive federal aviation liability
statute.
Russell P. Veldenz

lump sum award could be distributed evenly among all class members.
This method still provides a deterrent to willful misconduct but at the same
time prevents multiple recoveries deterring the same conduct and financial

ruin of the defendant. See Kreindler, Punitive Damages in Aviation Litigation-An Essay, 8 Cum. L. REV. 607, 615-16 (1978) for further discussion.
238. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
239. Kennelly, Aviation Law: Domestic Air Travel-A Brief Diagnosis
and Prognosis, 56 Cm. B. REc. 248, 267-68 (1975).

